Richard Tuck’s book reconstructs the historical debate that led ultimately to the modern concept of natural right. His study has the virtue of supplying a critical perspective often missing in the current controversy over the nature and status of rights.

Lemos’s examination of the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke has as its intended focus "the timeless philosophical significance of their positions and arguments." He is as much concerned, however, with correcting their arguments and carrying out the implications of his own corrections as he is with their thought. Lemos’s decision to disregard the metaphysics, physics, psychology, and epistemology of Hobbes and Locke is merely stated, without support. One might dispute its validity. Likewise, his exclusion of any references to the (...) predecessors or contemporaries of Hobbes and Locke and references to other interpretations costs his book valuable perspective. (shrink)

In his preface to Hobbes: Morals and Politics, Raphael tells us his intention is to provide "a genuine introduction for the student starting from scratch." That ought not deter others more familiar with Hobbes from reading the book. Raphael’s analysis is well-informed, sometimes insightful, and certainly worth reading. In addition to its intention to serve as an introduction, the book is also a vehicle for a rather elaborate interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of obligation. The interpretation of its Raphael in with (...) the school of thought represented by Howard Warrender, F. S. McNeilly, et. al. (shrink)

Is the history of philosophy a complex history of errors? That, according to Jonathan Rée, author of the first of three essays that comprise this book, is the prevailing sentiment of contemporary philosophy, which tends to perceive the history of philosophy as a "diversion from real philosophical activity." That sentiment, Rée argues, is the by-product of a failure of the history of philosophy itself, the "unhistorical history of philosophy." Rée maintains that the nature of philosophical history is determined by concepts (...) employed by the history of philosophy. Histories of philosophy have characteristically tended to locate a number of "eternally available and unchanging" positions to which philosophers are said to have ascribed with which they engage other philosophers "as though they were participants at a modern philosophy conference." Because it fails to "involve some conception of history," the "orthodox History of Philosophy is a fabric of illusions and distortions.". (shrink)

In his preface to The High Road to Pyrrhonism, Popkin tells us his book is a "partial fulfillment" of the promise he made in his earlier History of Scepticism to extend into the eighteenth century his investigation of his intent "to show how historical research can illuminate certain major issues in philosophy and the ideas of certain major thinkers." Anyone familiar with The History of Scepticism must surely have been impressed with the scholarly care that went into its writing. We (...) are indebted to Popkin for what his study shows, that the philosophers who have become history’s legacy to introductory philosophy courses did not philosophize in vacuums. Their thoughts emerged as the products of philosophical debates with contemporaries such as Montaigne, Gassendi, Mersenne, etc., who were the philosophical equals of their more famous brethren, even though not favored by history with comparable recognition. Were The High Road to Pyrrhonism an expansion of that excellent study, it would be welcome indeed. (shrink)

Is the history of philosophy a complex history of errors? That, according to Jonathan Rée, author of the first of three essays that comprise this book, is the prevailing sentiment of contemporary philosophy, which tends to perceive the history of philosophy as a "diversion from real philosophical activity." That sentiment, Rée argues, is the by-product of a failure of the history of philosophy itself, the "unhistorical history of philosophy." Rée maintains that the nature of philosophical history is determined by concepts (...) employed by the history of philosophy. Histories of philosophy have characteristically tended to locate a number of "eternally available and unchanging" positions to which philosophers are said to have ascribed with which they engage other philosophers "as though they were participants at a modern philosophy conference." Because it fails to "involve some conception of history," the "orthodox History of Philosophy is a fabric of illusions and distortions.". (shrink)